In this paper we provide an overview of Tullock's work on rent-seeking in the area of economics education. After summarizing the basic rent-seeking model in both a domestic and international context, we conduct an analysis of undergraduate and graduate texts in public economics. We find a majority of undergraduate texts cover rent-seeking in depth, but two texts provide zero coverage. No graduate textbook surveyed mentions rent-seeking. We conclude by summarizing the economic education literature on rent-seeking, which can be divided into either classroom experiments or popular culture examples.
Introduction
In the 50 years since the publication of Tullock's (1967) seminal article, it has been cited thousands of times (Mueller, 2016) . As evidenced by citations, the influence of his work has extended into nearly all fields of economics and beyond (Durden et al., 1991) . In this paper we attempt to catalog and assess how Tullock's work on rent-seeking has been incorporated into undergraduate and graduate textbooks. In addition, we summarize the literature on economic education that focuses on rentseeking so that teachers interested in incorporating this literature into their classrooms can do so.
Thus, this paper focuses is on the existence and treatment of rent-seeking in graduate and undergraduate public economics textbooks. The relative importance given to the subject, however, is dependent on the instructor. Nevertheless, the introduction of rent-seeking in textbooks is a first step to introducing the human behavior into the public economics discussion. In short, both the act of interest groups and the political process will generate inefficiency and lost welfare due to investments in rent-seeking.
What we do not do in this paper, however, is make the case for why rent-seeking should be included in textbooks and public economics classes. Perhaps, as scholars exposed to public choice at formative stages of our careers, this seems self-evident to us and does not need to be articulated. For those reading this paper who are not of the public choice school, however, it is important to briefly reflect on why rent-seeking should be well-represented in all textbooks, not just public sector textbooks.
1 We can think of at least three reasons why students should be taught rent-seeking and its importance to the world around us. First, a large part of what economists do, especially in public economics courses, is focus on social inefficiency. Rent-seeking is clearly socially inefficient. Second, rent-seeking -in the broadest sense -is a pervasive feature of humanity. Demonstrating rent-seeking's pervasiveness can provide for students a more accurate and complete understanding of human motivation across different institutional settings. Finally, the discussion of rent-seeking and its importance highlights for students how economies became distorted away from a "free market economy."
We proceed in the following manner. Section 2 discusses Tullock's (1967) and Krueger's (1974) seminal papers on rent-seeking. We briefly sketch these models for two reasons. First, some readers might prefer to have a self-contained article to hand to a student or colleague teaching public economics for the first time. Second, Mueller (2016) notes that Krueger (1974) has more citations than Tullock's (1967) and therefore textbook discussions might cite her or follow her approach but not his.
Section 3 and 4 present how rent-seeking is treated (or not) in undergraduate and graduate public economics textbooks, respectively. Section 5 reviews the economic education literature on rent-seeking, and Section 6 concludes.
The Rent Seeking Model
The two seminal papers on rent-seeking are Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974) . Combined these papers have over 8,000 citations (Mueller, 2016) . While Tullock (1967) introduces the rent-seeking problem by discussing monopolies and tariffs, Krueger (1974) applies this concept in an international trade framework. Each author followed a different path to explain the emergence of rent-seeking and its consequences. Tullock (1967) uses a simple graphical approach while Krueger (1974) develops a formal model and present some comparative statics. In this section we summarize both presentations of the rent-seeking problem and the implication raised by both authors.
Tullock's Graphical Model
Tullock (1967) discusses three problems in which rent-seeking behavior is likely to arise: tariffs, monopoly and theft. At first these three problems may seem unrelated, however they are connected through some underlying mechanisms: transfers, and inefficiency.
At first, tariffs, monopoly, and theft create transfers from one group to another group. For instance, tariffs would create a transfer from international to domestic producers; a monopoly would create transfers from consumers to producers; and theft from the robbed to the burglars. If the transfers were to be the only concern, in terms of social welfare this would not be a problem, as the overall social welfare would remain the same, however, this is not the case.
The biggest concern is the inefficiency. The three problems Tullock (1967) discusses will result in an inefficient use of resources which sums up to a substantial loss to welfare. As argued by the author, governments will not enact tariffs on their own, but instead they will do so given the pressure (or lobbying) from domestic producers.
Similarly, a non-natural monopoly will be created only if firms invest in acquiring this "privilege". On the other hand, people who do not want to get robbed, would have to spend productive time defending their property rather than producing. These investments in the attempt of acquiring "privilege" or "protection", in other words, the rent-seeking activities, are the biggest loss to society. Tullock (1967) points out that these activities are hard to identify and measure. Tullock (1980) lays out rent-seeking as a game problem and provides evidence of what would be the efficient level of rent-seeking and how much would be lost in rent-seeking investment. This paper, although not pointed out by Tullock (2003) as crucial in the development of the rent-seeking concept, has been widely used in rentseeking experiments (Dechenaux et al., 2015) . A simple algorithm is used to calculate individual and total investments. We reproduce these equations below
where P A is the equilibrium investment, R is the determinant of the steepness of the supply curve (or exponent) , N is the number of players, and b is the bias weight.
Sherementa (2015) provides a more intuitive approach to this model such that P A can be understood as the agent's effort to get the rent and R is the rent's prize.
As noted by both authors, the effort is increasing in the value of the prize (R) and decreasing in the number of players (n), which is the so-called "discouragement effect".
The intuition behind the bias weight is the differentiation of players instead of purely restricting their participation in the rent-seeking activity.
Krueger's Model
Although Tullock (1967) was published seven years earlier than Krueger (1974) , the latter does not cite Tullock's work. Tullock (2003) discusses the development of the idea of rent-seeking and why it was easy for others to miss his 1967 paper until Krueger's (1974) paper was published. It was Krueger (1974) who introduced the term rent-seeking to the literature and is on the list of the twenty most influential AER papers of the first one hundred years of the journal (Arrow et al., 2011) .
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One key difference between Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974) is that the former relies on a graphical approach with intuitive arguments, while the latter develops a simple mathematical model to show the rent-seeking problem. One commonality in the papers is the discussion of tariffs as a rent-seeking issue. However, while Tullock's work describes the problem in a developed society, Krueger focuses on developing economies, which is likely why it has subsequently contributed to a large literature on corruption and governance in development. Below we discuss the main features of Krueger's (1974) model, and leave for the interested reader to refer to the original paper for more detail.
The model set-up is a basic one. The economy produces only agricultural goods which are exported, while it imports consumption goods. The only input used is
where A is output and L A is the labor employed in agriculture. The demand for imports (M ) depends on the price (p M ) and income that is created by the level of
Lastly, the labor force supply is fixed and composed by labor in agriculture (
Under free trade the following occur:
. However, once import restrictions with competitive rent-seeking occur,
One implication of the introduction of rent-seeking is change in food consumption. Equation (7) refers to the free trade scenario and equation (8) to the rent-seeking one.
Lastly, Krueger (1974) shows the total value of rents, R:
Overall, although Tullock (1967 Tullock ( , 1980 and Krueger (1974) show the rent-seeking problem using different tools, the conclusion is the same: the loss to welfare from rent-seeking is not only those of inefficiency. Rather, there is a larger loss resulting from the investment in lobbying to acquire the rent.
Rent-seeking in Undergraduate Public Textbooks
To assess the treatment of rent-seeking at the undergraduate level, we reviewed 6 prominent public economics textbooks aimed at the undergraduate market. The six textbooks are Rosen and Gayer (2013) , Holcombe (2006) , Hindriks and Myles (2006) , Ulbrich (2013) , Gruber (2016), and Hillman (2009) . These textbooks were selected because they are among the most widely used and representative of undergraduate public economics textbooks. As shown in Table 1 , the majority of undergraduate public economics textbooks surveyed include rent-seeking. Although there are differences in both prominence and method of coverage among textbooks, a few common patterns emerge. Across textbooks, the definition for rent-seeking generally highlights its inefficiency. Resources are used unproductively rather than productively. One difference across definitions is whether rent-seeking is applied specifically to rents created by governments. For example, Rosen and Gayer (2013) define rent-seeking as "using the government to obtain higher than normal returns" (p. 123). Hillman (2009) also emphasizes governments in the definition of rent-seeking. Rents are private benefits that would not be generated through a market process but instead require government intervention.
However, Hindriks and Myles (2006) focus on inefficiency rather than government intervention. They define rent-seeking as the "expenditure of resources to create a profitable opportunity that is ultimately damaging to society" (p. 337). In the discussion surrounding their definition, the emphasis is on the inefficiency of rent-seeking and operating inside the production possibilities frontier. Hindriks and Myles (2006) build the model by considering a prize to be won between two competitors. They explore when there will be complete and partial rent dissipation and how the results change with free-entry and risk aversion.
The ease of a graphical illustration may be a reason for why undergraduate texts are unlikely to include a mathematical treatment of rent-seeking. Each undergraduate text surveyed that includes rent-seeking also includes a graphical treatment. The graphical treatment builds upon an illustration that students are already familiar with-the deadweight loss of monopoly. In a straightforward way, the texts are able to
show that the full deadweight loss to society includes not only the Harberger triangle but also the area containing monopoly profits. The most substantive treatment of the true deadweight loss is given in Hindriks and Myles (2006) as they include a discussion of real-world estimates. They not only mention that overall welfare loss from rent-seeking is between 4 and 13 percent of gross corporate product but also provide an example from the US Federal Communications Commission. In their allocation of 643 regional cell phone licenses, there were approximately 320,000 contestants with the total costs from all applications around $400 million.
A majority of undergraduate textbooks covering rent-seeking do include a discussion of its importance, although in unique ways. Hillman (2009) (2006) . One explanation for the lack of coverage is that Holcombe (2006) appears to be written so as to be timeless. With no current empirical estimates, Holcombe (2006) naturally does not include a discussion of its importance. There are many ways that a topic can be considered important, and the undergraduate textbooks that consider rent-seeking generally include a unique discussion of why rent-seeking matters for a society.
While rent-seeking has permeated most undergraduate textbooks, the concept is not covered at all in Ulbrich (2013) and Gruber (2016) . Both textbooks are public finance texts, not public economics books, which might explain part of the lack of coverage of rent-seeking. Both texts, however, are about the practice of public finance, and thus ultimately are about improving public sector outcomes. An understanding of rent-seeking and how it affects efficiency would seem to be at the core of improving public policy and thus the exclusion of rent-seeking is problematic.
Rent-Seeking in Graduate Public Textbooks
We surveyed the six most prominent graduate textbooks in the field of public economics. The six textbooks are: Laffont (1988) , Myles (1995) , Kaplow (2011 ), Salanie (2011 ), Tresch (2015 , and Atkinson and Stiglitz (2015) . While rent-seeking is wellrepresented among the undergraduate texts surveyed, we found zero coverage of rentseeking in graduate public economics textbooks. Instead of identifying the different ways that rent-seeking is covered in graduate textbooks, this section instead explores possible reasons for why graduate textbooks do not discuss rent-seeking at all.
One possibility is that the rent-seeking model is not amenable to theoretical work.
However, this is an unlikely explanation because there is a voluminous literature on theoretical models of rent-seeking with multiple areas of extension. A few early extensions include risk averse rent-seekers (Hillman and Katz, 1984) , uncertain rents (Jadlow, 1985) , non-identical sharing rules (Nitzan, 1991) , and rent-seeking for pure public goods (Katz et al., 1990) . New theoretical rent-seeking papers are continuing to be published, such as new variants of incomplete information in rent-seeking contests (Wasser, 2013) and optimal taxation (Rothschild and Scheuer, 2016) . Rent seeking models have and continue to be applied across a wide range of settings, suggesting that the reason for a lack of rent-seeking in graduate textbooks is not due to a lack of theoretical work related to rent-seeking.
While the theoretical literature on rent-seeking is large, empirical studies of rentseeking are less common as measuring rent-seeking is difficult. Thus, a lack of empirical work could explain why rent-seeking is not included in graduate texts. Despite the empirical difficulties, as surveyed in Del Rosal (2011), there are dozens of empirical rent-seeking studies. However, the measures of rent-seeking employed are defined in ad hoc and arguably imperfect ways. One common way, as in Laband and Sophocleus (1988) , is to proxy for rent-seeking by the number of lawyers in a country as lawyers are key players in rent-seeking markets. A novel approach by Sobel and Garrett (2002) is to define rent-seeking as having an excess proportion of business activity related to rent-seeking across capital cities in the United States. Empirical evidence for rent-seeking remains scant and relies upon imperfect measures of rent-seeking.
To the extent that graduate textbooks focus on core models with clear empirical applications, rent-seeking models are unlikely to be included.
The lack of rent-seeking coverage in graduate public textbooks might overstate the extent to which Tullock (1967) is not covered in graduate public economics courses.
Most doctoral courses are paper driven, not book driven. Graduate syllabi typically include links to seminal articles that are covered in class, while graduate public textbooks seem to be primarily used as reference documents or in masters level courses.
Rent Seeking and Economic Education
The instructor desiring to expose her students to the concept of rent-seeking has a number of options depending on the course and preparation of the students. One of the current authors, for example, would have his intermediate microeconomics students read Tullock (1967) during the section of the course on monopoly. Principles instructors, of course, are free to utilize the textbooks and examples described in Section 3. Or they can develop their own classroom example that would be of interest to students, such as the textbook market, as illustrated by Pecorino (2006) . Our view,
following Herbert Spencer, is that it takes varied iterations to get concepts to stick with students. For those looking for multiple and varied examples that allow for both repetition of concepts but variety, there exist a number of papers and materials in the economic education literature to assist. This literature can be broken down into two types: classroom experiments and media/popular culture. We briefly discuss each in turn.
Classroom Experiments
The rise of experimental economics as a field in economics has led to a rise in use of experiments as a teaching tool. Holt (1999) provides a good introduction to the history of experiments in the classroom and issues related to conducting them. Goeree and Holt (1999) describes a simple classroom exercise that illustrates rent-seeking and the dissipation of rents. They urge instructors to put the exercise into a specific economic context, so as to help students with understanding and facilitate discussion.
The context used in Goeree and Holt (1999) is the auctioning off of regional cellular telephone licenses by the US Federal Communications Commission, although their instructions can be adapted to a variety of other contexts.
The game described by Goeree and Holt (1999) involves four variations of an auction of a telephone license worth $16,000. The license is awarded by lottery. The class is divided into four groups, each endowed with $100,000. Each team can purchase an opportunity to win the telephone license for $3,000. Up to thirteen opportunities can be purchased a round and the described game lasts three rounds. While students are initially focused on which team earned the most, post-game discussion is easily channeled towards the concept of rent dissipation. If more than five $3,000 "lottery" tickets are purchased in total by the four teams in a round then the total value of the rent is dissipated. Goeree and Holt (1999) includes three variations on the game that illustrate different aspects of the problem, such as decreasing the amount of each "ticket" to $1,000, which tends to encourage more rent-seeking attempts.
The Goeree and Holt (1999) game is straightforward and, given the team nature of the exercise, can easily be adapted to classrooms of different sizes. Individuals not desiring to spend an entire class on the game can just do one round, while the different variants allow the exercise to be extended in a way that provides ample information for subsequent discussion and reflection by students on the incentives facing individuals in a rent-seeking game. 6 Bischoff and Hofmann (2002) and Strow and Strow (2006) provide additional modification and variations on Goeree and Holt (1999) . In particular, new instructors will find the preparation information in Strow and Strow (2006) to be very helpful.
Media and Popular Culture
In Potter. Gillis and Hall (2010) provides an example from The Simpsons regarding market power and rent-seeking to keep a monopoly that would fit in well with a discussion of Tullock's (1967) paper and why he wrote it. More The Simpsons examples that can be used to illustrate rent-seeking can be found in Considine (2006) and Hall (2014) . Not unsurprisingly, the television show Parks and Recreation, which focuses on the parks department of a small Indiana town, provides multiple examples of rent-seeking as detailed by Conaway and Clark (2015) .
Conclusion
With two exceptions, in the fifty years since the publication of Tullock (1967) , rentseeking has become standard in undergraduate public economics textbooks. Fike and Gwartney (2015) show that is also true for principles textbooks, with rent-seeking covered in nearly all major principles textbooks except for a couple of outliers. 7 As the expansive title of Tullock's (1967) 
